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Abstract Previous research has shown that rating words for
their relevance to a future scenario enhances memory for those
words. The current study investigated the effect of future
thinking on false memory using the Deese/Roediger–
McDermott (DRM) procedure. In Experiment 1, participants
rated words from 6 DRM lists for relevance to a past or future
event (with or without planning) or in terms of pleasantness.
In a surprise recall test, levels of correct recall did not vary
between the rating tasks, but the future rating conditions led to
significantly higher levels of false recall than the past and
pleasantness conditions did. Experiment 2 found that future
rating led to higher levels of false recognition than did past and
pleasantness ratings but did not affect correct recognition. The
effect in false recognition was, however, eliminated when
DRM items were presented in random order. Participants in
Experiment 3 were presented with both DRM lists and lists of
unrelated words. Future rating increased levels of false recog-
nition for DRM lures but did not affect correct recognition for
DRM or unrelated lists. The findings are discussed in terms of
the view that false memories can be associated with adaptive
memory functions.
Keywords False memory . Adaptivememory . Future
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In the Deese/Roediger–McDermott (DRM) procedure, named
after studies by Deese (1959) and Roediger and McDermott
(1995), participants study lists of words that are associates of a
nonpresentedcritical lure (e.g., associatessuchasbed,wake,rest,
and dream are presented but the critical lure sleep is not). As
numerous studies have testified, this procedure gives rise to an
illusion of memory in which participants erroneously claim that
the critical lures were presented (see Gallo, 2010, for a review).
The DRM illusion is reliably observed in tests of recall and rec-
ognition (Roediger &McDermott) and persists even when par-
ticipantsare forewarnedabout it (McDermott&Roediger,1998).
Theeffecthasbeenattributed to thespontaneousactivationof the
critical lures in response to list items followed by source moni-
toring errors (Roediger,Watson,McDermott, &Gallo. 2001) or
to the formation of Bgist^ traces that represent the theme of each
list (Brainerd&Reyna, 2002).
Recently, several lines of research have led to the view that
false memories, including those produced by the DRM proce-
dure, can result from adaptive processes typically associated
with positive effects on memory (see Fernandez, 2015; Howe,
Garner, Charlesworth, & Knott, 2011; Schacter, 2012;
Schacter, Guerin, & St. Jacques, 2011, for recent discussions
of the adaptive nature of false memories). Studies that have
taken an individual differences perspective have shown that
ostensibly positive psychological traits can be associated with
increased susceptibility to false memories. For example,
Castel, McCabe, Roediger, and Heitman (2007) found that
experts were at increased risk of domain-relevant intrusions
when attempting to recall words related and unrelated to their
domain of expertise. Castel et al. suggested that the superior
organizational processes of experts support the associations
that give rise to false memories. Within the DRM literature,
Dewhurst, Thorley, Hammond, and Ormerod (2011) found a
positive correlation between creativity, as measured by the
remote associates task (RAT; Mednick, 1962), and
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susceptibility to false recall. In a related study, Howe, Garner,
Dewhurst, and Ball (2010) found that DRM lists primed so-
lutions to RAT problems, but only when the critical lures were
falsely recalled, thereby showing that false memories can
themselves be adaptive (see also Howe, Garner,
Charlesworth, & Knott, 2011; Howe, Garner, & Patel, 2013;
Howe, Threadgold, Norbury, Garner, & Ball, 2013). One lim-
itation of these studies is that performance on the RAT prob-
lems involves the same associative processes that underlie the
DRM illusion. More recently, however, Otgaar, Howe, van
Beers, van Hoof, and Bronzwaer (2015) found that perfor-
mance on a perceptual closure task (identifying degraded
words) was enhanced when the targets were critical lures from
previously studied DRM lists. According to Otgaar et al., the
importance of this finding from an adaptive perspective is that
it links false memories to performance on a task typically
associated with intelligence (e.g., Luteijn & Barelds, 2004).
The idea that false memories may be functional is not new
(see Johnson & Raye, 1998; Roediger, 1996, for discussions
of the functions of false memories). This view has, however,
gained momentum recently, and several studies have directly
investigated the adaptive functions of false memories. A par-
ticularly salient illustration of the adaptive nature of false
memories was provided by Howe and Derbish (2010), who
investigated the effects of a survival rating task on correct and
false recognition. A compelling programme of research by
Nairne and colleagues (e.g., Nairne & Pandeirada, 2008;
Nairne, Pandeirada, & Thompson, 2008; Nairne, Thompson,
& Pandeirada, 2007) has shown that rating words for their
relevance to a survival scenario, such as being stranded in
the grasslands of a foreign country, leads to higher levels of
correct recall and recognition than other elaborative encoding
tasks do, including generation, self-reference, pleasantness
ratings, and rating the words for their relevance to a
nonsurvival scenario, such as moving house. Howe and
Derbish replicated the survival advantage in correct
recognition and, in addition, found that survival rating led to
higher levels of false recognition relative to the moving house
and pleasantness tasks. Howe and Derbish speculated that
processing information in terms of its survival value primes
related information that guides attention to other aspects of an
environment that may themselves be useful for survival. In a
similar study, Otgaar and Smeets (2010) found that survival
rating increased correct and false recall with both DRM lists
and lists of categorized words. They also showed that survival
rating increased correct and false recall of DRM lists in youn-
ger and older children.
Recent research into the adaptive nature of memory, both
true and false, has focused on the survival paradigm. Yet,
according to Klein, Cosmides, Tooby, and Chance (2002), a
more fundamental role of memory is to support the planning
of future behaviour (see also Schacter, Addis, & Buckner,
2008). This view was supported in a recent study by Klein,
Robertson, and Delton (2011), in which they showed that
planning is the crucial element in producing the memory ad-
vantage in survival rating. They compared conditions in
which participants rated words for their relevance to scenarios
that involved (i) survival and planning, (ii) planning but not
survival, and (iii) survival but not planning. They found higher
levels of correct recall in the conditions involving planning
relative to the condition that involved only survival. This
future-oriented function of memory was previously demon-
strated by Klein, Robertson, and Delton (2010), who
instructed participants to recall a previous camping trip or to
imagine a future camping trip. Participants were then present-
ed with a list of object nouns, either related or unrelated to
camping, and asked to rate the likelihood of encountering each
object on the camping trip. Klein et al. found higher levels of
correct recall following the future rating task relative to the
past rating task. Future rating also led to higher levels of recall
than survival and atemporal encoding tasks did.
The aim of the current study was to investigate the effects
of future-oriented rating tasks on false memory. If, as pro-
posed by Howe and Derbish (2010), rating DRM lists for their
survival value increases false memories by activating related
information that might also aid survival, then a similar in-
crease in false memories should emerge in a future rating task
via the activation of related information that might aid plan-
ning. Based on the procedure developed byKlein et al. (2010),
participants imagined a past or a future scenario. They were
then presented with a series of DRM items and instructed to
rate them for their relevance to the imagined scenario.
Participants in a control condition rated the items for pleasant-
ness. We also attempted to isolate the effects of planning by
using two versions of the past and future rating tasks; a stan-
dard version based on the procedure developed by Klein et al.
and an alternative version in which planning was emphasized
(see Klein et al., 2011, who found that planning mediates the
effect of survival processing on correct recall). Based on the
previous findings that false memories in the DRM procedure
can be associated with adaptive memory processes, our pre-
diction was that the future-oriented rating tasks would produce
higher levels of false memories than the past and pleasantness
rating tasks would. Experiment 1 tested this prediction by
measuring free recall after each list. Experiments 2 and 3
extended the investigation to tests of recognition memory.
Experiment 1
Method
Participants
One hundred twenty undergraduates (93 females) from the
University of Hull participated for course credit. All were
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native English speakers between the ages of 18 and 28 years
(M = 20.12, SD = 2.00). Participants were tested at individual
workstations in groups of up to five.
Stimuli and design
Six DRM lists of 10 items each were adapted from Stadler,
Roediger, and McDermott (1999) and consisted of associates
of the critical lures cold, anger, doctor, sleep, sweet, and
mountain (presented in this order for half the participants
and in the reverse order for the remaining participants).
Study items were blocked by list, and items within each list
were presented in descending order of backwards associative
strength (strength of association from the list item to the crit-
ical lure). The five orienting tasks were past, past (planning),
future, future (planning), and pleasantness. These weremanip-
ulated between participants, with 24 in each group.
Procedure
Participants in the pleasantness condition were told that the
purpose was to investigate emotional responses to verbal stim-
uli. The remaining participants were told that the purpose was
to investigate the processes involved in thinking about past (or
future) events. An incidental learning procedure was adopted
whereby no mention was made of the forthcoming memory
test. Prior to the presentation of the study lists, participants
received one of the following sets of instructions:
Past condition Think back and remember a specific time in
your past when you went on a holiday. Try to remember spe-
cific details of this holiday, such as the things you did, the
people you were with, the sights and sounds you experienced,
and so on. While you are remembering this holiday, I am
going to present you with a list of words. Using the response
sheet provided, I would like you to rate how relevant each of
these words was to the holiday you remember. Some may be
relevant and others may not. It’s up to you to decide. Please
spend a few moments remembering this holiday and wait for
further instructions.
Past (planning) condition Think back and remember a spe-
cific time in your past when you planned a holiday. Think
about the preparations you had to make and the things you
had to organize before you went on the holiday. While you
think about the planning that was involved, I am going to
present you with a list of words. Using the response sheet
provided, I would like you to rate the relevance of each item
to this planning. Some may be relevant and others may not.
It’s up to you to decide. Please spend a few moments remem-
bering the planning that went into this holiday and wait for
further instructions.
Future condition Think ahead and imagine a specific time in
your future when you will go on a holiday. Try to imagine
specific details of this holiday, such as the things you will
do, the people you will be with, the sights and sounds you will
experience, and so on. While you are imagining this holiday, I
am going to present you with a list of words. Using the re-
sponse sheet provided, I would like you to rate how relevant
each of these words will be to the holiday you imagine. Some
may be relevant and others may not. It’s up to you to decide.
Please spend a few moments imagining this holiday and wait
for further instructions.
Future (planning) condition Imagine that you are planning a
holiday. Think about the preparations you will need to make
and the things you will have to do before you can go on the
holiday. While you think about the planning involved, I am
going to present you with a list of words. Using the response
sheet provided, I would like you to rate the relevance of each
item to this planning. Some may be relevant and others may
not. It’s up to you to decide. Please spend a few moments
imagining the planning that will go into this holiday and wait
for further instructions.
Pleasantness condition I am going to present you with a list
of words. Using the response sheet provided, I would like you
to rate how pleasant you think each word is. It is up to you
how you define pleasantness. It can refer to the meaning of the
word, the sound of the word, or some other property. It’s up to
you to decide.
In order to allow sufficient time for the rating tasks, study
items were presented one at a time at a rate of one every
10 seconds. Each list was preceded by the list number (List
1, List 2, etc.). Participants in the past and future conditions
were asked to rate the relevance of each word on a 5-point
scale (1 = totally irrelevant to 5 = totally relevant). The rating
scale for the pleasantness condition ranged from 1 = very
unpleasant to 5 = very pleasant. After the presentation of the
final list, participants were engaged in simple math problems
for 2 minutes. They were then given a surprise recall test in
which they were instructed to recall as many words as possi-
ble, in any order. Participants were allowed 5 minutes to com-
plete the recall test.
Results and discussion
Table 1 shows mean numbers of list items correctly recalled
and critical lures falsely recalled as a function of rating task.
Correct and false recall data were initially analyzed in separate
one-way ANOVAs, with rating task as the between-groups
variable. Alpha was set at .05 in this and all other analyses.
The analysis of correct recall found no reliable effect of rating
task, F < 1. However, a significant main effect was observed
in the false recall of critical lures, F(4, 119) = 14.07, MSE =
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.86, p < .001. Bonferroni-adjusted pairwise comparisons
showed that, relative to the pleasantness condition, levels of
false recall were significantly higher in the future and future
(planning) conditions, both ps < .001. Levels of false recall
were also higher in the past and past (planning) conditions
relative to the pleasantness condition, but these differences fell
short of statistical significance, both ps = .06. Levels of false
recall were significantly higher in the future condition than the
past condition and past planning conditions, both ps = .03.
The future (planning) condition also produced significantly
higher levels of false recall than the past and past (planning)
conditions, both ps = .003. The future and future (planning)
conditions did not differ significantly from each other, p = 1.
Unrelated intrusions were low and not significantly affected
by rating task, F < 1.
The effects of temporal direction and planning were further
analyzed in a 2 (past vs. future) × 2 (planning vs. no planning)
between-groups ANOVA. The analysis of correct recall
showed nonsignificant effects of temporal direction, F(1, 92)
= 1.52, p = .22, ηp
2 = .02, and planning, F(1, 92) = 2.42, p =
.12, ηp
2 = .03, and a nonsignificant interaction, F < 1. In
contrast, the analysis of false recall showed a significant effect
of temporal direction, F(1, 92) = 21.24, p < .001, ηp
2 =.19,
whereby future rating led to higher levels of false recall than
past rating. Neither the effect of planning nor the interaction
were significant, both Fs < 1.
The ratings provided during the study phase were analyzed
in a one-way ANOVA. The main effect of rating task was
significant, F(4, 119) = 9.37, MSE = .19, p < .001.
Bonferroni-adjusted pairwise comparisons showed that mean
ratings in the pleasantness condition (2.80) were significantly
higher than ratings in the past (2.26), future (2.35), past
(planning) (2.15) and future (planning) (2.33) conditions, all
ps<.005, which did not differ significantly from each other.
The main finding from Experiment 1 is that rating DRM
lists for their relevance to a future event leads to reliably
higher levels of false recall than rating them for their relevance
to a past event. This was the case irrespective of whether the
rating tasks involved planning or not. Adding a planning com-
ponent to the past and future conditions did not significantly
increase levels of false recall. In contrast to the findings of
Klein et al. (2010), the future rating tasks did not lead to higher
levels of correct recall than the past rating tasks did. In fact, no
significant differences in correct recall were observed between
any of the rating tasks. A possible explanation for the null
effects in correct recall is that any potential effects of rating
task were overshadowed by the semantic theme of the DRM
lists. This was investigated in Experiment 2, in which we
manipulated the organization of the DRM lists.
Experiment 2
The primary aim of Experiment 2 was to determine whether
the effects of future thinking on false recall extend to false
recognition. Because there were no significant differences be-
tween the planning and no planning conditions, this manipu-
lation was dropped from Experiment 2, and only the future
(planning), past (planning), and pleasantness conditions were
retained. The three rating tasks were manipulated within
groups. As noted previously, a further aim was to investigate
the possibility that the null effect of temporal direction in
correct memory was due to the associative nature of the
DRM lists. To this end, Experiment 2 incorporated a
between-groups manipulation of list structure whereby, for
half the participants, the DRM lists were presented in a
blocked list-by-list sequence, and for the remaining
participants the words were presented in a randomized order.
Toglia, Neuschatz, and Goodwin (1999) found that blocked
presentation reduced the magnitude of the DRM illusion, a
finding they attributed to a reduction in the saliency of the
semantic themes of the individual lists. If the null effect of
future thinking in correct memory observed in Experiment 1
was due to the saliency of the list themes, reducing this salien-
cy should allow effects of future thinking to emerge in correct
memory.
Method
Participants
A new group of 80 undergraduate students (49 females) from
the University of Hull participated for course credit. They
were native English speakers in the age range 18 to 57 years
(M = 21.86, SD = 7.74). They were tested at individual work-
stations in groups of up to five.
Stimuli and design
Each participant rated 24 DRM lists of 10 items each, with
eight lists in each rating condition. For 40 of the participants,
the 80 words within each condition were presented in a
blocked, list-by-list sequence, with the words in each list pre-
sented in order of backwards associative strength. For the
Table 1 Mean numbers (with standard deviations) of studied items
correctly recalled (max = 60), critical lures falsely recalled (max = 6),
and unrelated intrusions as a function of rating task
Study condition List items Critical lures Unrelated intrusions
Past 27.88 (4.50) 1.33 (.87) .58 (.77)
Future 26.33 (6.23) 2.17 (1.17) .63 (.82)
Past (planning) 25.96 (6.54) 1.33 (.92) .67 (.82)
Future (planning) 24.63 (5.35) 2.33 (.92) .50 (.83)
Pleasantness 26.04 (6.80) 0.58 (.71) .29 (.62)
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remaining 40 participants, the 80 words within each condition
were presented in a random order. Allocation of list to rating
condition and the orders in which conditions and lists were
presented were rotated across participants. The recognition
test consisted of three words from each list (the critical lure
plus studied items from positions 3 and 5). The corresponding
items from eight unstudied DRM lists provided the unrelated
distractors in the recognition test.
Procedure
The rating instructions were the same as those used in
Experiment 1. Participants read the first set of instructions
and then rated eight DRM lists accordingly. The words
were presented at a rate of one every 5 seconds and re-
sponses were recorded using ePrime software. Each word
remained on the screen for the full 5 seconds regardless of
response time. This procedure was repeated for the re-
maining two rating tasks. After the final list had been
rated, participants were engaged in simple math problems
for 10 minutes. The surprise recognition test was then
administered using ePrime software.
Results and discussion
Table 2 shows mean proportions of hits and false alarms as a
function of list structure and rating task. These were analyzed
in separate 2 (structure: blocked vs. random) × 3 (rating task:
past vs. future vs. pleasantness) ANOVAs with repeated mea-
sures on the second factor. Analysis of correct recognition
showed a significant main effect of structure, F(1, 78) =
5.69, MSE = 23.20, p = .019, ηp
2 = .07. As can be seen from
Table 2, hit rates were higher following blocked presentation
rather than random presentation. Neither the main effect of
rating task nor the interaction with structure were significant,
F < 1. The analysis of false alarms to critical lures showed
nonsignificant main effects of structure, F < 1, and rating task,
F < 1.3. There was, however, a significant interaction between
structure and rating task, F(2, 156) = 6.68, MSE = 2.06, p =
.002, ηp
2 = .08. Bonferroni-adjusted pairwise comparisons
showed that, in the blocked condition, future rating led to
higher levels of false recognition of critical lures than both
past rating, p = .041, and pleasantness rating, p = .006, which
did not differ reliably from each other, p = 63. There were no
significant pairwise comparisons in the random structure con-
dition. The mean proportions of unrelated lures falsely recog-
nized were .13 in the blocked condition and .17 in the random
condition.
Study ratings were also analyzed in a 2 (structure) × 3
(rating task) ANOVA. This yielded a significant main effect
of structure, F(1, 78) = 4.18, MSE = .66, p = .044, ηp
2 = .05,
whereby ratings were higher overall in the random condition
(M = 2.59) than in the blocked condition (M = 2.37). There
was also a significant main effect of rating task, F(2, 156) =
44.64, MSE = .19, p < .001, ηp
2 = .36. Bonferroni-adjusted
pairwise comparisons showed that mean ratings in the pleas-
antness condition (2.86) were significantly higher than in both
the past (2.30) and future (2.28) conditions, both ps < .001,
which did not differ significantly from each other, p = 1. The
interaction between structure and rating task was not signifi-
cant, F < 1.
The results of Experiment 2 extend the effects of future
rating on false memory from free recall to recognition.
Specifically, the future rating condition led to higher
levels of false recognition than the past rating and pleas-
antness rating conditions. The results of Experiment 2
also confirm that the effect of future rating persists when
the rating tasks are manipulated in a within-subjects de-
sign. A caveat to this, however, is that the effect of future
rating on false recognition was only observed when the
DRM lists were presented in a blocked design. Presenting
the study items in a random order eliminated the effect.
This contrasts with the findings of Howe and Derbish
(2010) that survival rating increased false memory when
DRM lists were presented in random sequences. This is
considered further in the general discussion.
As in Experiment 1, rating task did not reliably influence
levels of true memory. These null effects are in contrast to the
findings of Klein et al. (2010), that rating words for their
relevance to a future camping trip produced higher levels of
recall than rating the words for their relevance to a past
camping trip. As discussed previously, it is possible that the
null effects of temporal direction observed in the current study
were due to the use of DRM lists, in which the studied items
are highly associated with each other as well as with the crit-
ical lure. Although random presentation eliminated the effects
of future thinking on false recognition, levels of false recog-
nition overall were still relatively high (see Table 2), which
suggests that random presentation did not prevent participants
from making associations at study. In order to investigate this
further, we conducted Experiment 3 in which participants
Table 2 Mean proportions (with standard deviations) of studied items
correctly recognized and critical lures falsely recognized as a function of
structure and rating task
List structure Studied items Critical lures
Blocked
Past (planning) .84 (.14) .56 (.20)
Future (planning) .87 (.12) .66 (.20)
Pleasantness .86 (.12) .51 (.21)
Random presentation
Past (planning) .76 (.22) .54 (.28)
Future (planning) .75 (.27) .51 (.29)
Pleasantness .78 (.24) .58 (.28)
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studied both DRM lists and lists of unrelated nouns.1 As in
Experiment 2, participants rated the words for relevance to a
past event, a future event, or in terms of pleasantness, in a
within-subjects design. If the null effects in true memory ob-
served in Experiments 1 and 2 were due to the use of DRM
lists, then an effect of future thinking should occur in the
unrelated lists but not in the DRM lists.
Experiment 3
Method
The method was the same as Experiment 2 with the following
modifications:Anewgroupof 45participants (33 females)were
recruited. All were native English speakers between the ages of
18 and 23 years (M = 19.44, SD = 1.25). Participants studied six
DRM lists in each of three conditions: relevance to a future hol-
iday, relevance to a past holiday, and pleasantness. In addition to
the six DRM lists, participants rated six lists of 10 unrelated
common nouns in each condition, withDRMand unrelated lists
alternating. The words were selected from the MRC
Psycholinguistic Database (Coltheart, 1981). Four sets of DRM
and unrelated lists were created and rotated through the three
rating conditions. The fourth set provided the unrelated
distractors in the recognition test. The recognition test consisted
of 64 studied items (two from each list), the 18 critical lures from
DRM lists, 18 distractors from six unstudied DRM lists, and 18
distractors from unstudied unrelated lists.
Results and discussion
Table 3 shows mean levels of correct recognition for the DRM
andunrelated listsandmeanlevelsoffalse recognitionforDRM
lists. Correct recognition scores were analyzed in a 2 (list type:
DRM vs. unrelated) × 3 (rating task: past vs. future vs. pleas-
antness) repeated-measuresANOVA.A significantmain effect
of list type was observed whereby correct recognition scores
were higher for unrelated lists than for DRM lists, F(1, 44) =
7.01,MSE = 1.60, p = .011,ηp
2 = .14. A significant main effect
of rating taskwasalsoobserved,F(2,88)=11.13,MSE=1.98,p
= .001, ηp
2 = .20. Bonferroni-adjusted pairwise comparisons
showed that pleasantness ratings led to significantly higher
levels of correct recognition than both future rating, p = .046,
and past rating, p < .001. The interaction between list type and
rating taskwas not significant,F(2, 88) = 1.81,MSE=2.21, p=
.17, ηp
2 = .04. A one-way ANOVA conducted on the critical
lures of DRM lists showed a significant main effect of rating
task, F(2, 88) = 5.33, MSE = 1.10, p = .007, ηp
2 = .11.
Bonferroni-adjusted pairwise comparisons showed that future
rating led to higher levels of false recognition of critical lures
than did past rating, p = .006, and pleasantness rating, p = .044,
which did not differ from one another, p = 1. Themean propor-
tion of unrelated lures falsely recognized was .17.
Study ratings were analyzed in a 2 (list type: DRM vs, unre-
lated) × 3 (rating task: past vs. future vs. pleasantness) repeated-
measures ANOVA. The main effect of list type was not signifi-
cant,F<1.Therewas,however,asignificantmaineffectof rating
task,F(2,88)=53.23,MSE=.33,p<.001,ηp
2= .55.Bonferroni-
adjusted pairwise comparisons showed that mean ratings were
significantly higher for thepleasantness condition (2.91) than for
thepast (2.11)and future (2.20)conditions, bothps< .001,which
did not differ reliably from each other, p = .39. The interaction
between list type and rating was not significant,F(2, 88) = 1.39,
MSE = .03, p = .25, ηp
2 = .03.
The findings of Experiment 3 confirm those of
Experiments 1 and 2 in showing that rating words in relation
to a future event leads to higher levels of false memory than
rating them in relation to a past event or in terms of pleasant-
ness. The main objective of Experiment 3 was to investigate
whether the null effects of future thinking in true memory
were due to the use of DRM lists. As in Experiments 1 and
2, future thinking did not increase levels of correct recognition
of DRM lists, relative to past thinking or pleasantness. Nor did
future thinking increase correct recognition of unrelated lists.
In fact, correct recognition scores were significantly lower in
the past and future conditions relative to the pleasantness con-
dition. These findings suggest that the null effects of future
thinking in true memory are not due to the use of DRM lists.
This issue is considered further in the general discussion. The
finding that correct recognition scores were higher for unre-
lated lists than for DRM lists is likely due to the differences
between the lists in terms of grammatical class. The unrelated
lists consisted of common nouns similar to those typically
used in the survival paradigm (e.g., Nairne et al., 2007). In
contrast, DRM lists include adjectives, verbs, and abstract
nouns, which are less memorable than common nouns (e.g.,
Paivio, 1971; Simpson & Klippert, 1968).
General discussion
The main finding from the current study is that rating DRM
lists for their relevance to a future scenario led to higher levels1 We thank Henry Otgaar for this suggestion.
Table 3 Mean proportions (with standard deviations) of studied DRM
and studied unrelated items correctly recognized and critical lures falsely
recognized as a function of rating task
Study condition DRM items Critical lures Unrelated items
Past (planning) .63 (.18) .37 (.19) .70 (.15)
Future (planning) .69 (.17) .47 (.22) .71 (.15)
Pleasantness .74 (.09) .37 (.22) .75 (.10)
Mem Cogn (2016) 44:1076–1084 1081
of false recall than rating them for their relevance to a past
scenario or in terms of pleasantness. This effect was observed
in both free recall (Experiment 1) and recognition memory
(Experiments 2 and 3). These findings add to the growing
body of evidence that false memories can result from adaptive
processes that usually have positive consequences for memo-
ry. Previous studies have shown that false memories can prime
problem solutions (e.g., Howe et al., 2010; Otgaar et al., 2015)
and are increased by survival rating (Howe & Derbish, 2010;
Otgaar & Smeets, 2010). The current study extends these
findings by showing that similar increases in false memory
are produced by future thinking. The effects of temporal di-
rection cannot be attributed to differences in the study ratings,
because the only reliable differences to emerge were signifi-
cantly higher ratings for pleasantness relative to the other rat-
ing tasks.
In Experiment 1, half the participants in the past and future
conditions were explicitly instructed to think about the plan-
ning involved in the holiday they remembered or imagined.
Although the future (planning) condition led to the highest
levels of false recall numerically, the emphasis on planning
did not significantly increase levels of false recall. In contrast,
Klein et al. (2011) found that adding a planning component to
a survival processing paradigm led to higher levels of correct
recall than standard survival instructions. In an earlier study,
Klein et al. (2010) showed that the effect of survival process-
ing is mediated by the future-orientation of the survival con-
dition, rather than survival per se, which they attributed to an
implicit planning requirement. Although Klein and colleagues
did not measure false recall, their findings, along with those of
Experiment 1, suggest that planning is inherently involved in
future-oriented tasks. Adding an explicit planning require-
ment does not significantly increase the levels of correct or
false recall beyond those produced by future thinking.
Although the future rating tasks led to higher levels of false
memory than the past and pleasantness rating tasks did, we did
not replicate the finding by Klein et al. (2010, 2011) of higher
levels of true memory in the future conditions. The divergent
results are likely to reflect procedural differences. The most
salient difference is that we used DRM lists whereas Klein et
al. used schema-related stimuli (e.g., words related to a
camping scenario). It is possible that the semantic themes of
the DRM lists overshadowed the effect of rating task and led
to equivalent levels of correct recall and recognition in all
conditions. A problem with this explanation is that the manip-
ulation of rating task did not reliably affect correct recognition
in Experiment 2 when items fromDRM lists were presented in
random sequences, or in Experiment 3 when participants stud-
ied unrelated lists. However, as noted in the discussion of
Experiment 2, random presentation of DRM stimuli does not
eliminate the semantic themes of the lists, it merely reduces
their salience. It is likely that the associative nature of DRM
stimuli overshadowed the effects of rating task even with
random presentation. Regarding Experiment 3, it is possible
that the presentation of DRM lists at study influenced the
encoding and retrieval of unrelated lists, though the precise
mechanism for this is unclear. We are currently investigating
whether the presentation of schema-related stimuli, similar to
those used by Klein et al., can lead to effects of future thinking
in both correct and false memory.
There are other important differences between the current
study and those reported by Klein et al. (2010, 2011). For
example, Klein et al. used a between-subjects manipulation
of rating task followed by tests of free recall. In contrast,
Experiments 2 and 3 of the current study used a within-
subjects manipulation of rating task followed by tests of rec-
ognition memory. In addition, Klein et al. instructed partici-
pants to remember or imagine a camping trip, whereas partic-
ipants in the present study remembered or imagined a holiday.
Identifying the boundary conditions of the effects reported by
Klein and colleagues is beyond the scope of the current study.
It is important to note, however, that we observed null effects
in correct memory in three experiments, in tests of both recall
and recognition, and following both between- and within-
subjectsmanipulations of rating task. Although the differential
effects in correct memory have yet to be explained, our focus
in the current study was on the effects on future rating on false
memory. We have demonstrated a consistent and replicable
pattern whereby rating words for their relevance to a future
event leads to higher levels of false memory than rating them
for their relevance to a past event.
Although the null effect of future thinking on correct mem-
ory is at odds with the findings of Klein et al. (2010, 2011), the
overall pattern of results is consistent with data reported by
Nairne et al. (2007). Nairne et al. (Experiment 1) compared
the effects on free recall of rating words for their relevance to
survival, to moving house, or for pleasantness. From the per-
spective of the current study, the most salient finding is that,
relative to pleasantness ratings, the moving scenario (which
could be interpreted as a future planning task) had no effect of
correct recall but led to significantly higher levels of false
recall.2 Although false alarm rates were low (the stimuli were
unrelated nouns rather than DRM lists), the fact that Nairne et
al. observed the same dissociation between correct and false
memory as observed in the current study provides indirect
support for the validity of the current findings. The pattern is
also consistent with findings reported by Dewhurst, Bould,
Knott, and Thorley (2009), who found that explicitly
instructing participants to make associations to studied DRM
items increased false recognition but had no effect on correct
recognition. The current findings suggest that merely facilitat-
ing the generation of associates can elicit the same pattern.
The activation-monitoring account of the DRM illusion
(Roediger et al., 2001) can explain the current findings if
2 We are grateful to Jim Nairne for drawing our attention to this.
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one assumes that imagining a future event facilitates associa-
tive processes at encoding, relative to remembering a past
event. Support for this possibility comes from research show-
ing that imagining future events leads to more flexible think-
ing than does remembering past events (see D’Argembeau,
Ortoleva, Jumentier, & van der Linden, 2010). As discussed
by Anderson, Dewhurst, and Nash (2012), it may be adaptive
to represent future events in a less specific and more schema-
tized form than past events. In terms of the current study, the
greater flexibility of future thinking may have enabled partic-
ipants to think creatively about the possibility of encountering
studied items in a hypothetical future event, thereby increasing
the possibility of activating the critical lure. In terms of fuzzy-
trace theory (Brainerd & Reyna, 2002), it is possible that fu-
ture thinking facilitates the formation of gist traces, which give
rise to false memories, but has no effect on verbatim traces,
which support correct memories.
The current findings do not, therefore, arbitrate between
activation-monitoring theory and fuzzy-trace theory.
Nevertheless, the increase in false but not correct memory
following future rating is particular salient for theories of the
DRM illusion, as this pattern has rarely been observed in
previous research. The only example we are aware of is the
finding by Dewhurst et al. (2009), that explicitly instructing
participants to make associations to studied items increased
false but not correct recognition. Another recent study from
our lab (Dewhurst, Rackie, & van Esch, 2016) found precisely
the opposite pattern whereby a manipulated variable increased
correct but not false memory. Specifically, we found that
translating between modalities at study (e.g., writing a word
presented auditorily) increased correct recognition but had no
effect on false recognition. This is analogous to the
Bgeneration at no cost^ pattern reported by Soraci, Carlin,
Toglia, Chechile, and Neuschatz (2003). They found that gen-
erating DRM study items from fragments increased correct
recall and recognition but had no reliable effect on false recall
or recognition. In contrast, numerous studies have reported a
Bmore is less^ pattern, whereby an independent variable si-
multaneously increases correct and false memory (Toglia et
al., 1999). Less common in the DRM literature is the finding
of an independent variable that simultaneously increases cor-
rect memory and reduces false memory (see Benjamin, 2001,
for an example). Any theory of memory must be able to ac-
count for these different patterns (see Dewhurst et al. 2015, for
further discussion of this). The more examples we can find of
the less common permutations, such as the pattern observed in
the current study, the easier it will be to identify the processes
that underlie the DRM illusion.
The current findings can also be contrasted with those of
Howe and Derbish (2010), who found that survival rating
increased both correct and false memory using DRM lists.
Howe and Derbish presented DRM lists in random
sequences, but Otgaar and Smeets (2010) found that these
effects also occur with blocked presentation. These studies
found parallel effects in true and false memory, whereas the
current study found effects only in false memory. It is important
to note, however, that survival rating and future planning are
not the same task. Although the two tasks share some common-
alities (e.g., both require participants to imagine a hypothetical
scenario), the present findings suggest important differences in
terms of their effects on memory. For example, Klein et al.
(2011) found that the effect of survival rating on correct recall
was enhanced when instructions emphasized planning. In con-
trast, the addition of a planning component in Experiment 1 of
the current study did not enhance the effect of future thinking
on false recall. A useful goal for future research would be to
attempt to disentangle the effects of survival rating, planning,
and future thinking on correct and false memory.
In conclusion, the current findings lend further support to the
emerging view that false memories and memory illusions can
result from mnemonic processes that typically have a positive
influence on memory (Howe, 2011; Schacter et al., 2011).
Previous research has shown that rating DRM lists for their
relevance to a survival situation increases false memories of
the critical lures (Howe & Derbish, 2010; Otgaar & Smeets,
2010). The current study extends this pattern to a planning task
by showing that rating words for their relevance to a future
scenario leads to higher levels of false recall and false
recognition than rating their relevance to a past scenario or
rating them in terms of pleasantness. There are, however, a
number of differences between the effects of survival rating
and the effects of future thinking on correct and false memory.
Despite these, the current findings are consistent with the views
of Klein et al. (2002) that one of the primary functions of human
memory is to support the planning of future acts. The current
findings illustrate the generality of this future-oriented function
of memory by showing that the associative processes that give
rise to false memories are also enhanced by future planning.
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